Decisionmaking in Congress

CQ writers explain

From CQ/ Roll Call (update of data on op. 272-274 of Davidson)

From CQ/Roll Call (update of data on p. 284 of Davidson):



Interest group ratings

• WHY IS THE NRA POWERFUL? IT IS NOT THE MONEY
• The "Daschle Loophole" -- his ill-fated HHS nomination
• Lobby numbers
• A graphic
• Deregistration 
• Think tanks
• Consultants
• Recognition and awards
• Philanthropy
• Politicians' charities (see the rule, pp. 347-349)
• Rent-a-friend as deep lobbying
• Lobbyist cites letter that he ghost-wrote!
• A summary

Conditions for Deliberative Negotiation

• First, participants must agree to acceptable sources of information. In some cases, the various sides rely on their own partisan facts; however, in other cases, the negotiation setting builds in an explicit role for nonpartisan third parties or technical expertise.
• Second, a bargaining situation includes implicit decisions about patterns of interaction among participants; in particular, the decision to incorporate repeated interactions among parties may help to overcome myopia-inducing short-term and zero-sum calculations. The fear of each party that others will not cooperate (e.g., in the prisoner’s-dilemma game) creates incentives for short-term, self-interested choices. Bringing participants together in repeated engagements  facilitates future punishments for uncooperative behavior and, consequently, fosters trust and commitment.
• Adam Smith was clear on the concept: "A dealer is afraid of losing his character and is scrupulous in observing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps twenty contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbour, as the very appearance of a cheat would make him lose. When people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury which it does their character.
• Third, decisions must be made about the consequences for nonaction in a negotiation process. Setting penalty defaults may move negotiators toward action, overcome blocking coalitions, and improve the chances for agreement 
• Finally, decisions must be made about the degree of autonomy and privacy accorded to negotiators. In general, privacy boosts negotiators’ capacities to bargain effectively by producing some autonomy from influences that try to shift the focus away from the core objects of negotiation or that insist on hard-line positions opposed to compromise